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Abstract
Poor economies not only produce less; they typically produce things that involve fewer inputs and fewer
intermediate steps. Yet the supply chains of poor countries face more frequent disruptions—delivery failures,
faulty parts, delays, power outages, theft, government failures—that systematically thwart the production
process. To understand how these disruptions affect economic development, we model an evolving input–
output network in which disruptions spread contagiously among optimizing agents. The key finding is that
a poverty trap can emerge: agents adapt to frequent disruptions by producing simpler, less valuable goods,
yet disruptions persist. Growing out of poverty requires that agents invest in buffers to disruptions. These
buffers rise and then fall as the economy produces more complex goods, a prediction consistent with global
patterns of input inventories. Large jumps in economic complexity can backfire. This result suggests why
“big push” policies can fail, and it underscores the importance of reliability and of gradual increases in
technological complexity.
Producing valuable goods and services is a com-
plex, intricate process. One obtains inputs from a
multitude of suppliers who must honour their con-
tracts and deliver those inputs without them break-
ing, spoiling, or being stolen. These inputs must
be stored safely and manipulated in interdependent
stages, using labour from workers who may fall ill
or shirk their duties, together with complex equip-
ment and vast infrastructure that may malfunction.
These complex interdependencies underlie specializa-
tion and trade that are the foundation of economic
growth and material progress [1, 2].
Yet this progress, and the disruptions that thwart
it, are unevenly distributed around the world. In
low-income countries, disruptions can be frequent,
long-lasting, and severe. They include power out-
ages [3, 4], worker absenteeism [5], failed deliveries of
products, water shortages, customs delays, damage
from natural disasters, and epidemic disease (Fig. 1).
Poor countries also tend to produce simpler goods,
especially primary resources like timber, mining, and
subsistence agriculture [6, 7, 8].
In middle- and high-income countries, by contrast,
inputs tend to be more reliable, and goods produced
tend to be more complex. But rich economies are not
immune to disruptions: competition drives firms to
build lean supply chains with buffers so small that
disruptions can cascade around the globe, causing
large aggregate losses [14, 15].
Might the mechanisms causing globalised supply
chains to become fragile also be preventing poor
economies from becoming more complex and global?
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Figure 1: Disruptions to the production process
tend to be more frequent in poorer, less complex
economies. The color of each dot indicates the coun-
try’s Economic Complexity Index (ECI) [9, 10]; a red
triangle is drawn is ECI is missing. Black lines are
least-squares fits, with per-capita incomes [11] on a
logarithmic scale. Natural disaster risk combines ex-
posure and ability to cope [12]. Adult mortality rate
is the chance that a 15-year old dies before age 60
[13]. Data in the first five plots are from [4].
This question stretches the limits of our understand-
ing of economic growth and complexity. Input–
output linkages among firms—wherein one firm’s out-
put is another firm’s input—are known to have large,
nonlinear effects on economies. In theoretical mod-
els, these linkages propagate changes in productiv-
ity [16, 17, 18, 19], disruptions [20], and bankrupt-
cies [21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. Empirical research on
industrialised economies finds that supply-chain dis-
ruptions often lead to lower stock prices and sales
growth [27, 28, 29, 30]. These disruptions, and the
uncertainty that they entail, affect development: they
cause firms to use less capital [20], to misallocate in-
puts [17, 18], or to form shorter supply chains [25],
generally hindering the economy to industrialise [16]
and limiting the effectiveness of policy [31, Chapter
4]. However, in these models, disruptions are treated
as exogenous, and firms interact once in a static net-
work. These assumptions preclude the dynamic feed-
backs that can generate complex outcomes such as
poverty traps and periodic cycles.
Modelling dynamic production networks is a chal-
lenging problem, involving heterogeneous input–
output patterns and input elasticities [32]. Recent
models consider firms that endogenously form input–
output linkages [33, 34, 35]; others consider firms de-
ciding how to source their inputs in a risky supply
chain with one [36, 37] or more [38, 39, 40] tiers. Miss-
ing is an understanding of how fast dynamics in eco-
nomic networks, such as disruptions in supply chains,
affect their long-run evolution and their growth in
complexity.
We aim to fill this theoretical gap by introducing a
simple model that captures complex dynamics of dis-
ruptions spreading in an evolving input–output net-
work. The main result is that poverty can emerge
and reinforce itself: facing an unreliable environment
of potential inputs, agents choose simple production
processes that require few inputs, but disruptions re-
main frequent. Escaping this trap requires investing
in buffers against disruption, such as arranging for
extra suppliers or storing inventories of inputs. We
find empirical support for the prediction that these
buffers grow and then shrink as economies develop.
When they shrink too much, disruptions can spike
in number, as occurs in lean supply chains today.
This mechanism also imperils developing economies:
jumping abruptly to a more complex technology can
backfire by causing greater dysfunction, suggesting
that “big push” policies [41] may benefit from techno-
logical gradualism. We suggest that this alternative
perspective—focused on contagion in evolving sup-
ply chains—may shed light on why poor economies
are not catching up and why some interventions fail.
Model of contagious disruption
in an evolving input–output net-
work
We consider a large population of agents who rep-
resent entrepreneurs or firms producing goods and
services that require inputs from other agents. The
model framework is meant to correspond to a vari-
ety of situations that broadly represent the process
of coordinating inputs and outputs for economic pro-
duction: launching a business requires intermediate
goods from suppliers; coordinating stakeholder meet-
ings requires a quorum of attendees; repairing equip-
ment requires parts supplied by others; and so on.
Our focus on fragility has antecedents in Kre-
mer’s “O-Ring theory” of economic development, in
which a single mistake—like the malfunctioning O-
Ring that triggered the explosion of the Challenger
Space Shuttle—can doom a sequence of interrelated
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tasks [20]. That study shows how fragility can lead
to highly skilled workers matching with each other.
Here, we focus on how people respond by using sim-
pler technology or by investing in buffers against dis-
ruption so that some failures can be endured.
Balls-and-urn model of production and
contagious dysfunction
At each time t, all agents exist in one of two states.
A fraction F (t) of agents are functional : they re-
cently succeeded in producing and can provide in-
puts to others upon request. The remaining fraction
1 − F (t) are dysfunctional : they recently failed to
produce and cannot provide inputs to others.
Agents become functional and dysfunctional as
they succeed and fail, respectively, in producing
goods or accomplishing tasks. Each agent attempts
to produce a good requiring τ many inputs. Attempts
at producing a good occur randomly at a constant
rate (as a Markov process). We do not track types
of inputs nor economic sectors. This simplification
allows us to abstract from which pairs of inputs are
substitutes by using a simple threshold rule: an agent
attempts to obtain inputs from m agents in the pop-
ulation, and she succeeds in producing if and only if
at least τ of those m many inputs are successfully
produced and delivered to her (see Fig. 2). We call
m the number of attempted inputs, and we think of
it as the in-degree when viewing these interactions as
an input–output network.
This threshold rule captures the idea that some in-
puts are critical: without them, production halts or
fails. For example, the March 11, 2011 earthquake
near Japan closed the Hitachi factory that produced
most of the world’s airflow sensors, a critical input
for cars. As a result, automobile factories on the
other side of the globe had to curb production or
close [15]. In the developing world, drip irrigation
has failed in Sub-Saharan Africa due to disruptions
in water infrastructure and scarce knowledge for re-
pair [42]; adulterated fertilizer sold in Ugandan mar-
kets yields negative average returns [43]; Internet-
connected kiosks in India fell into disuse because of
unreliable electricity and insufficient service from op-
erators [44].
The simplifications above allow us to describe an
evolving input–output network, together with disrup-
tions spreading on it, using a single differential equa-
tion for the expected fraction of functional agents
attempts m = 4 inputs; produces & 
 becomes functional (  ) if 3 ≥ τ
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Figure 2: Illustration of the model. Agents (drawn
as disks) are people or firms who are either func-
tional or dysfunctional at any moment in time. Func-
tional means that the agent has enough inputs needed
to produce or to accomplish a task, and that other
agents can rely on this agent for inputs. Agents at-
tempt to produce a good (or to have a meeting with
other people, etc.) using m inputs drawn randomly
from the population (indicated by arrows), and they
succeed if at least τ of those suppliers are functional.
F (t):
dF/dt := P [Binomial(m,F (t)) ≥ τ ]− F (t) (1)
for t ≥ 0 and integers m ≥ 0 and τ > 0.
(If τ = 0, then there is little to model, so we
let dF/dt := 0.) This framework is a balls-and-
urn model [45, 46] taken to an infinite-population,
continuous-time limit, so that transition probabilities
become deterministic rates of change in the mean-
field master equation (1) [47]. (Master equations are
used to describe the dynamics of microeconomic ac-
tors in social science [48] and economics [49, 50].) We
derive equation (1) in Supplementary Note 1 and ex-
plain it next.
For simplicity, the input–output network is ran-
dom and “annealed”: in each production attempt,
inputs are chosen uniformly at random with replace-
ment from the population. This annealed network
captures the idea that people do different tasks that
require different inputs: an engineer fixes a machine
on Monday and leads a meeting on Wednesday; an
entrepreneur tries one business idea this year and an-
other idea the next year, requiring different inputs for
each step. Later, we relax this assumption.
All agents use the same value of (m, τ) (i.e., they
play “symmetric strategies”). Therefore, the chance
of successful production is the probability P that a
binomial random variable with parameters m and
F (t) is ≥ τ , where τ is the number of critical inputs
needed. This threshold rule resembles the essential
inputs and critical subtasks in the “O-Ring theory” of
Kremer [20], but here people can have buffers against
failures: the number of attempted inputs (m) can ex-
ceed the number of inputs needed (τ). This threshold
3
rule also appears in models of social contagion and
collective behavior [51, 52, 53], but here we have an
annealed network, bidirectional changes in state, and
decision making, described later.
Some disruptions may result not from other agents’
dysfunction but from other causes, such as fires, in-
sect outbreaks, weather, and so on. To capture these
exogenous disruptions, we assume that all agents in-
dependently become dysfunctional for exogenous rea-
sons at a small rate  (according to a Poisson pro-
cess). This assumption introduces a −F (t) term to
the master equation (1):
dF/dt = [1− F (t)]P − F (t)(1− P + ) (2a)
= P − F (t)(1 + ), (2b)
where P is the probability that an agent successfully
produces, P [Binomial(m,F (t)) ≥ τ ]. The first term
in equation (2a) is the rate 1 − F (t) at which dys-
functional agents attempt to produce; each attempt
succeeds with probability P ; if the attempt succeeds,
then F (t) rises; otherwise F (t) stays the same, and
vice versa for the second term. Equation (2) is de-
rived in Supplementary Note 1, and it recovers equa-
tion (1) with  := 0.
The initial amount of dysfunction 1 − F (0) is ex-
ogenous; after that, disruptions are entirely endoge-
nous, spreading from supplier to customer. Driving
this contagion is the assumption that an agent deliv-
ers an input upon request if and only if she success-
fully produced in her most recent attempt to pro-
duce. For example, a Ugandan farmer who discovers
that her seeds were inauthentic [43]; an Ethiopian
farmer whose drip irrigation system fails because of
upstream failures [42]; or an automobile manufac-
turer who failed to produce due to missing parts
[14, 15] all may subsequently fail to deliver output
promised to a customer.
Deciding on complexity τ and on
buffers against disruption m− τ
The threshold τ loosely captures the complexity of
the good or service being produced: more complex
goods require more inputs [54, 55]. To capture the
incentives to create high-value products, we present
a simple, reduced-form model in which agents derive
utility from successfully producing goods that require
more inputs. We assume that when an agent suc-
cessfully produces, her induced utility grows with the
complexity of production; for simplicity, we express
this utility by τβ where β ∈ (0, 1). (This assumption,
that complexity underlies rising productivity, is stan-
dard in economic models [2, 55, 54]. For a derivation
of τβ , see Supplementary Note 2.) We also assume
that each attempted input costs α > 0. This param-
eter α represents the marginal cost of finding suppli-
ers, maintaining multiple suppliers for the same input
[56], incentivising suppliers to have multiple manufac-
turing sites [57], or maintaining inventory of inputs
[58]; for details, see Supplementary Note 3.
For simplicity, we assume that each agent knows
the current likelihood F (t) that a uniformly-random
supplier would successfully produce and deliver an
input upon request. Based on that reliability F (t),
agents revise their strategy of how complex a product
to produce (τ ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . }) and how many inputs
m ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . } to attempt to procure in order to
produce that good. For instance, if suppliers are un-
reliable [i.e., F (t) is small], then agents arrange for
redundant inputs (i.e., m−τ > 0) provided that they
can afford it. Agents must commit to a certain tech-
nology and production technique for a certain amount
of time T , so we assume that every T amount of time
all agents simultaneously update their strategy to the
“best response”, the maximiser (m∗, τ∗) of the utility
function
U [m, τ, F (t);α, β] := P [m, τ, F (t)] τβ − αm. (3)
Thus, agents’ strategies at time t are
(m∗, τ∗) = arg max
m,τ≥0
U [m, τ, F (kT );α, β] (4)
for t ∈ [kT, (k + 1)T ) where k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . }. To-
gether, equations (2)–(4) and the initial F (0) define
the model.
We have abstracted from considerations about
market equilibrium and price formation, hence ex-
pressing all payoff magnitudes in terms of some fixed
numeraire. Only τ goods are used in production, even
if more than τ of m suppliers are functional, because
unused inputs are assumed to be perfect substitutes
for used ones. (In Supplementary Note 2.2, we ex-
plain three alternative interpretations of the relation-
ship between inputs and outputs in the production
process.)
Results
Figure 3 illustrates the three phases of an economy in
this model: trapped, emerging, and rich. To under-
stand the figure, suppose that at time t = 0 agents
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successfully produce and deliver an input only 50% of
the time [i.e., F (0) = 50%]. Then, from equation (3),
agents choose the strategy (m∗, τ∗) = (3, 1), meaning
that agents produce a good requiring τ∗ = 1 input,
but they arrange for m∗ − τ∗ = 2 extra suppliers
because disruptions are common [1 − F (0) = 50%].
Using this strategy in an economy with reliability
F (0) = 0.5 causes disruptions to become less frequent
(dF/dt > 0), indicated by the green curve marked
“3, 1” in Fig. 3.
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Figure 3: Representative phase portrait, show-
ing the three phases of a model economy. Here,
(α, β, ) := (0.1, 0.4, 0.001). The black, green, and
red curves are the ODE (2) with labels indicating
the best response (m∗, τ∗) and colours denoting the
sign of dF/dt. Best responses are computed numer-
ically using the method explained in Supplementary
Note 4.
Figure 3 corresponds to an economy in which
agents best respond arbitrarily quickly based on the
reliability F (t) of their fellow agents; that is, the best-
response timescale T is arbitrarily close to 0. This
T → 0 limit is more analytically tractable because
dF/dt changes discontinuously wherever the best re-
sponse (m∗, τ∗) changes as a function of F (t). We
relax this assumption later when we discuss fragility
in rich economies.
Next we explain the economy’s three main phases
and a pitfall in reaching the “industrialised” phase.
Poverty trap with simple technology and fre-
quent disruptions
In an economy with frequent disruptions [F (t) near
zero], agents choose to withdraw from the economy by
not relying on any inputs from others (m∗ = τ∗ = 0).
This strategy resembles subsistence agriculture, hunt-
ing, and pastoralism. Such an economy is in steady
state: dF/dt is equal to 0 from equation (2), and no
agent wants to deviate from the strategy (0, 0).
This steady state also has a basin of attraction
(marked “poverty trap”in Fig. 3), provided that there
are some exogenous sources of disruption ( > 0).
(Specifically, for F just above α, the best response is
(m∗, τ∗) = (1, 1). That strategy means attempting a
task that requires τ∗ = 1 input and requesting that
one input from m∗ = 1 other agent. This strategy
has no redundant inputs. It succeeds in producing
with probability P [1, 1, F ] = F , so, from equation
(2), dF/dt = F − F −  < 0.)
Emerging economies’ buffers to disruption rise
and then fall
If an economy is sufficiently reliable then it be-
gins to develop. For instance, in Fig. 3 if
F (t) > 2−(β+1)
(
1−√1− α2β+2
)
≈ 11% then
agents choose to produce goods that require some in-
puts (τ∗ > 0). Provided that F (t) is not too close to
one (a case described later), the agents also arrange
for some extra inputs (m∗ > τ∗) in anticipation that
some inputs will not be functional. This strategy re-
sults in the economy becoming more functional over
time (dF/dt > 0) and producing ever more complex
goods [τ∗ rises with F (t)].
As this economy develops, two features rise and
then fall over time: the speed of development dF/dt
and the buffer against disruptions m∗−τ∗. (Later we
examine this inverted-U pattern empirically.) This
inverted-U reflects the following ideas. Firms in a
very unreliable economy need costly buffers against
disruption to produce even simple, low-value goods
(such as goods with complexity τ∗ = 1). The econ-
omy barely manages to produce such simple goods
using the small amounts of redundancy afforded by
the low earnings (for example, with redundancy m∗−
τ∗ = 2). When the economy is more reliable [higher
F (t)], more complex tasks become feasible with large
buffers against disruption, such as complexity τ∗ = 3
with buffer m∗ − τ∗ = 4. Finally, as the economy
becomes maximally reliable [F (t) approaches one],
agents economise on their costly buffer against dis-
ruptions (m∗ − τ∗), which leads to new vulnerabili-
ties.
Rich yet fragile
When the economy becomes very reliable [large F (t)],
agents produce very complex goods requiring many
inputs (large τ∗). Yet this high reliability also induces
5
agents to economise on their buffers to disruptions.
In fact, when F (t) is close to 1, they eliminate their
buffer (m∗ = τ∗). Then disruptions spread like a
virus to which no one is immune: F (t) falls, indicated
by the red curves in the bottom-right corner of Fig. 3,
where dF/dt < 0. Falling F (t) means that more and
more agents are unable to produce, and the drop in
output resembles a recession. Such downturns occur
generically in rich, highly functional economies: The-
orem 1 in Supplementary Note 5 shows that the state
F = 1 (a completely functional economy) is unstable
to perturbations. In our model, a rich, highly func-
tional economy is “fragile” in the sense that there are
large values of F (t) close to 1 for which dF/dt < 0.
This “rich yet fragile” phenomenon accords with re-
cent events: firms face pressure to build leaner sup-
ply chains, to invest in smaller buffers against dis-
ruptions, and to produce ever more complex goods,
resulting in occasional cascading disruptions [14, 15].
What happens after F (t) begins to fall depends on
how quickly agents best respond and whether the best
response is discrete. If agents commit to a strategy
for a positive amount of time T > 0, then the econ-
omy’s reliability F (t) falls until either (i) the economy
enters the poverty trap (which occurs only for very
large T ) or (ii) agents best respond in a way that
causes F (t) to begin to rise. F (t) can rise because
agents produce simpler, lower-value goods (smaller
τ) or because they increase the buffer against disrup-
tion (larger m). If m and τ are discrete (as considered
here) and T > 0, then the economy can cycle: After
F (t) rises for a while, agents best respond again, and
because their economy is quite reliable they choose
to produce very complex goods or to decrease their
buffer against disruption, and the process can repeat.
If the decision variables m and τ were made contin-
uous, or if T → 0, then economy may settle onto a
value of F smaller than one.
This fragility of rich economies complements theo-
ries of “aggregate fluctuations” [59, 60, 19, 61, 62, 32].
Those theories show how exogenous shocks to firms
can result in large changes in the total production in
the economy. One reason is heterogeneity: some firms
and sectors are much larger [60] or more connected
[19, 61] than others, so a small shock to these impor-
tant firms can have large consequences. The models
in [60, 19, 61, 62] are static and timeless, whereas
our model is inherently dynamic, with most “shocks”
caused by the endogenous failure of other firms. An-
other reason for aggregate fluctuations is that firms’
inventories self-organize to a critical point [59]. In
the model in [59], firms request inputs from suppli-
ers, and these requests spread through a fixed net-
work. Here, firms also request inputs from suppliers,
but disruptions (i.e., failures to produce due to in-
sufficient functional inputs) spread contagiously in a
network that changes over time.
Overshooting complexity can backfire
The core mechanism that causes downturns in the
rich economy also makes it difficult for emerging
economies to become rich and complex themselves.
Specifically, if an economy tries to “prematurely
jump” to a more complex technology, then it can
slide backward and become more dysfunctional. To
make this idea precise, suppose that agents do not
use the best response (m∗, τ∗) but instead attempt a
more complex strategy that requires s more inputs:
(m∗ + s, τ∗ + s). The buffer against disruptions re-
mains the same; it is still m∗ − τ∗. What is differ-
ent is that agents try to produce goods that require
more inputs, or they try to produce the same good
as before but using technology that depends on more
inputs, such as drip irrigation instead of traditional
irrigation [42].
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8,5 9,6 11,8
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poverty trap rich
m*+ 2,τ*+ 2 =
Figure 4: Jumping to a more complex technology
can backfire by causing dysfunction to rise, especially
for emerging economies. Here, agents use a strategy
that requires two more inputs than they would have
chosen given the reliability F (t) of their potential in-
puts: they use the strategy (m∗ + 2, τ∗ + 2), where
(m∗, τ∗) is the best response. The parameters are the
same as in Fig. 3.
Figure 4 shows that this strategy (m∗+2, τ∗+2) of-
ten results in dysfunction rising over time (dF/dt <
0), indicated by the red curves. In these intervals
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with dF/dt < 0, agents are “overshooting” in com-
plexity: they are attempting a production process
more complex than what the surrounding system can
support. This overshooting echoes failures to adopt
complex technologies in developing countries because
the technologies depend on myriad inputs prone to
disruption, such as drip irrigation systems [42] and
Internet kiosks [44].
Emerging economies are especially vulnerable to
overshooting in complexity: notice in Fig. 4 that
dF/dt < 0 for many intermediate values of F (t). As
a result, the poverty trap in Fig. 4 is dramatically
larger than when agents use the best response (com-
pare with Fig. 3). For example, an economy with F (t)
near 50% can fall into the poverty trap if it overshoots
in complexity for a sufficiently long amount of time.
By contrast, a rich economy can typically accommo-
date a jump in complexity without causing dysfunc-
tion to rise: in Fig. 4 there are many large values of
F (t) with dF/dt > 0.
Comparing Figs. 3 and 4, we see the benefit of grad-
ual growth in technological complexity. This pre-
scription is at odds with the classic idea of a “big
push” of simultaneously industrialising many sectors
of an economy [41]: a big push overcomes coordina-
tion problems, but it can add fragility by introducing
complex technologies that depend on unreliable in-
puts. This prescription for slow, gradual reform mir-
rors the suggestions given by a model of trust and
social capital [63].
Phase diagram
To demonstrate that the phenomena in Fig. 3 are
rather generic, Fig. 5 shows the sign of dF/dt and
the best response (m∗, τ∗) for many values of the pa-
rameter α, the marginal cost of each attempted in-
put. A poverty trap occurs for F (t) ∈ [0, α]; the
boundary F (t) = α is the indifference curve between
(m, τ) = (1, 1) and (0, 0). If the cost to arrange for
an input is too high (α > 1/4 in Fig. 5), then the only
long-run outcome is poverty. Otherwise, there exists
a good outcome in the long run in which the economy
is complex and highly functional, and buffers against
disruptions m∗ − τ∗ tend to rise and then fall as the
economy approaches this rich state.
However, there are pitfalls in reaching this rich
state. One pitfall is the “overshooting” described
above. Another is to decrease the cost α of each at-
tempted input. The marginal cost α is exogenous,
but it could change if, for example, communications
technology makes it easier to arrange alternative sup-
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Figure 5: Phase diagram of the sign of dF/dt
(dF/dt > 0 is green; < 0 is red; = 0 is black) and the
best response (m∗, τ∗) (white text) as a function of
α and F (t). The parameter α is assumed to change
slowly, if at all. Vertical white arrows illustrate the
dynamics dF/dt. Here, as in Fig. 3, β := 0.4, and
 = 0.001, so the strategy (m∗, τ∗) = (1, 1) results in
dF/dt < 0. Poor economies get stuck in the region
labelled “0, 0”. Rich, complex economies settle upon
limit cycles near where green lies below red at the top
of the diagram.
pliers. Decreasing α can trigger an escape from the
poverty trap if it puts the economy in the green region
in Fig. 5. But it can also make the economy more dys-
functional: if α is decreased into the red region, where
agents choose m∗ = τ∗ = 1, then dysfunction rises
(provided that exogenous failures occur, i.e.,  > 0).
The intuition is that decreasing α incentivises people
to attempt more complex production that uses more
inputs (higher τ∗), which can lead to more failure
than success, resulting in more frequent dysfunction
in the new steady state [lower F (t)]. If policymakers
sense this feedback, then they may avoid actions that
decrease α, keeping the economy stuck in the trap.
Countervailing effects of keeping functional
suppliers and of choosing popular suppliers
The model presented above is simplified by the as-
sumption that agents choose new suppliers uniformly
at random every time they try to produce. At the
other extreme, many models of economic cascades as-
sume a rigid input–output network [19, 21, 22, 24, 25,
26].
To explore a more realistic middle ground between
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these extremes, in Supplementary Note 6 we modify
the choice of suppliers in two ways: agents tend to
keep functional suppliers, and they bias their search
toward suppliers who already have many customers
(i.e., preferential attachment). These changes do not
affect the qualitative results insights of the model, but
they do have two interesting effects that we illustrate
using numerical simulations in Supplementary Figure
1.
One effect is that the economy is less likely to fall
into the trap. It is straightforward that a tendency
to retain functional suppliers helps F (t) grow. More
interestingly, a tendency to choose popular suppliers
also helps F (t) grow: because functional agents tend
to accumulate customers, having many customers is
correlated with being functional.
However, these two tendencies can generate
fragility. Once the economy is complex and highly
functional, it can rely on very few agents who sup-
ply almost everyone. When those “supplier-hubs”
become dysfunctional (because they rely on dysfunc-
tional suppliers or because they were suffered a rate-
exogenous failure), then the brittle economy can un-
dergo a severe downturn and cascading disruptions.
In summary, what makes an economy more likely to
emerge from the pull of poverty is precisely what
makes the economy fragile upon becoming complex.
Empirical support
Input inventories rise and then fall as
economies become more complex
There is scant data—especially in developing
countries—on supply-chain disruptions and on re-
sponses to them. Relevant data from the World
Bank’s Enterprise Survey include the number of days
of inventory that firms keep of their “main input”
(i.e., highest-value input) [4]. Stockpiling inputs is
one costly way to mitigate the risk of disruptions
in one’s supply chain [36], so it loosely corresponds
to our model’s buffer against disruption m∗ − τ∗.
Macroeconomic research has focused on inventories of
finished goods, but inventories of inputs have drawn
increasing attention [64, 65], and some models of in-
put inventories also consider intermediate goods and
supply chains [66, 67].
Recall from Fig. 3 that our model predicts that
buffers against disruptions to inputs (m∗ − τ∗) tend
to rise and then fall as economies develop. To test
this qualitatively, we plot in Figure 6(a) the input in-
ventory of firms averaged at the country level, for 95
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Figure 6: Qualitative match between (a) empirical
data on input inventories and (b) the model’s pre-
diction that buffers to supply-chain disruptions rise
and then fall as economies develop. (a) Input inven-
tories of firms, averaged at the country level [4], have
an inverted-U relationship with the complexity of the
economy [9, 10] (p-value 0.022 for the C2 coefficient;
R2 = 0.063; N = 95 countries; 95% mean predic-
tion band shown in gray). (b) Redundancy versus
complexity for α := 0.1,  := 0.001, and five values
of β, each a different colour. The curves show least-
squares fits to δ0+δ1τ
∗+δ2τ∗2. The data is dispersed
by N (0, 0.008× 1) to indicate density.
countries for which we have an estimate of the com-
plexity of the economy [9, 10]. This Economic Com-
plexity Index is calculated from the bipartite network
of countries and of the products that they export [8].
We find that input inventory has a statistically sig-
nificant inverted-U relationship with the complexity
C of an economy’s production. [A least-squares fit
of inventory with γ0 + γ1C + γ2C
2 has γˆ2 = −3.14,
with p-value = 0.02; see Fig. 6(a).] This relationship
qualitatively matches the inverted-U exhibited by the
model [Fig. 6(b)].
Case study: Drip irrigation
The reported uneven success of drip irrigation in dif-
ferent countries [42] illustrates the assumptions and
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messages of this model. Drip irrigation applies wa-
ter directly to roots at a small, consistent rate, which
increases efficiency and transforms land from arid to
arable. The technology is delicate and complex be-
cause it depends on a broad system of inputs: it re-
quires high-quality water to be delivered at the right
pressure, in pipes and tubes that match the local soil,
crop and weather. Its equipment needs expert advice
and repair. There is little buffer against malfunction
because crops fail quickly in dry soil if the water’s flow
is interrupted. In our model, drip irrigation resem-
bles a high threshold (high τ) technology (compared
to rainwater), for which there is little buffer against
disruptions (m− τ).
Drip irrigation has been “spectacularly successful”
in Israel, but “the very same hardware often turned
out to be completely useless in the sub-Saharan
African context” [42, p. 14]. Farmers in Israel en-
joy an “extensive infrastructural network so perva-
sive and successful as to be nigh invisible” [42, p.
16]. Their counterparts in Ethiopia and Zambia had
equipment from the same company, but they faced
problems in the surrounding socio-technical system
(of expertise, supply of water, and so on). Many
farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa are “gradually con-
vert[ing] [their farms] back to furrow irrigation as
each block of the buried drip irrigation fails” [42, p.
19]. Expressed in the language of our model, dysfunc-
tional inputs (low F ) can result in crops failing and
farmers choosing simpler, less productive technology
(lower τ). Drip irrigation has succeeded in poor re-
gions (such as in India) not because the technology
was simplified but because of sufficient support from
the surrounding socio-technical system [42, p. 22].
Discussion
Poverty traps have long been used to explain dis-
parities of incomes across countries and to justify a
“big push”, a coordinated investment in many sec-
tors to unleash growth [41, 68, 69, 70]. Yet many
big pushes have failed [71], and understanding why is
paramount.
Our model views industrialisation as mutually-
reinforcing supply chains, broadly defined, that be-
come more complex over time. Disruptions in these
supply chains can spread contagiously. This sys-
temic fragility can cause complex technologies to fail.
Even if all firms coordinate their industrialization (as
suggested by big push theories [41, 69]), if the firms
jump too far in technological complexity without suf-
ficient buffers against disruptions, then the economy
can slide backward, becoming poorer and less reli-
able. As in other complex systems [72], going slower
may result in collectively going faster.
This work sits at the intersection of competing the-
ories of economic development. According to research
on poverty traps [41, 68, 69, 70], positive feedback
loops keep populations stuck in poverty, and escap-
ing these traps requires substantial investments. Ac-
cording to research on institutions, differences in the
rules of the game (such as property rights and rule
of law) explain why economies have diverged [73, 74].
Our model provides a bridge between these views.
Because some inputs for production are from govern-
ment actors, our model is consistent with the institu-
tional view of development: better institutions may
imply fewer disruptions, less uncertainty, and hence
greater appetite for complexity. Consistent with the
poverty trap literature, our model has multiple equi-
libria. However, whereas poverty traps typically sug-
gest making a large investment, we find reason for
caution: without a focus on reliability of the sur-
rounding system, big changes fail. Interventions to
many parts of a system may be needed. Unreliabil-
ity affects economic performance in a multifaceted
way, involving risk [75], network contagion, technol-
ogy adoption [42], and psychology [76]. Understand-
ing their interplay can elucidate the causes of persis-
tent poverty.
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In Supplementary Note 4, we compute the finite set
of strategies that could be a best response for a given
α, β, and F (t). This derivation enables the compu-
tations used to make Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6(b).
Data availability
The empirical data used in Figure 1 and Figure 6(a)
are available from the original sources [9, 10, 11, 12,
13, 4] and at the GitHub repository associated with
this paper (DOI 10.5281/zenodo.823260).
Code availability
The code used to produce the results in this paper are
available at the GitHub repository associated with
this paper (DOI 10.5281/zenodo.823260). Figures
1–6 are created in the Wolfram Language (version 11)
and can be read for free using the CDF Player and
run for free using the Wolfram Cloud. Supplemen-
tary Figure 1 was created using Python (3.5.2) and
NumPy (1.11.3).
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Supplementary Information
SI-1 Derivation of the ODE (2)
Suppose that we have a large number of agents N ∈ N0, and let n(t) be the number of agents who are
functional at time t, so that
F(t) ≡ n(t)
N
is the fraction of agents who are functional at time t. F(t) is a stochastic process. Here we derive a mean-
field approximation for the master equation of F(t), which is an ordinary differential equation (ODE) for
the expected fraction of functional agents at time t, F (t) ≡ EF(t).
SI-1.1 Transition probabilities for a single agent
Attempts at producing are events that occur randomly according to a Markov process. All agents attempt
to produce at rate 1.
Agents also become dysfunctional at rate  for “exogenous” reasons that are not explicitly modeled. (We
have in mind that these exogenous failures are isolated incidents such as fires, natural disasters, insect
infestations, and so on.) These exogenous failures occur independently to each agent according to a Poisson
process with rate .
First we focus attention on a single agent. Let dt be a small, positive amount of time. Let ω(F→ D)dt be
the chance that an agent that is functional at time t is dysfunctional at time t+dt. Similarly, let ω(D→ F)dt
be the probability that a dysfunctional agent at time t is functional at time t+ dt.
There are many ways in which a functional agent at time t could become dysfunctional at time t+ dt. In
that short amount of time, this agent could do the following transitions:
1. F→ D: the agent tries to produce once and fails. This event occurs with probability dt(1−P ) +O(dt2).
2. F → D: the agent becomes dysfunctional for an exogenous reason. This event occurs with probability
dt+O(dt2).
3. F → F → D: the agent tries to produce twice, succeeding on the first try and failing on the second try,
and does not suffer any exogenous failures. This event occurs with probability O(dt2).
4. F → D → F → D: the agent tries to produce three times, succeeding on only the second of those tries,
and the agent does not suffer any exogenous failures. This event occurs with probability O(dt2).
5. And so on.
The chance of the first event is the chance that this agent is chosen to attempt to produce only once in the
amount of time dt, which occurs with probability dte−dt = dt+O(dt2), times the chance that the agent fails
to produce in that attempt, which is 1− P , times the chance that no exogenous failure hit the agent, which
is 1− dt+O(dt2). In sum, this event occurs with probability dt(1− P ) +O(dt2).
The chance of the second event above is the chance that the agent is not chosen to attempt to produce in
that time interval dt, which is 1− dt, times the chance of failing for exogenous reasons in an amount of time
dt, which is dte− = dt+O(dt2).
The probabilities of all the other events are O(dt2) because they require getting chosen at least twice to
attempt to produce. Therefore, to first approximation in this small, positive amount of time dt, the chance
that a functional agent at time t is dysfunctional at time t+ dt is
ω(F→ D)dt = dt× (1− P + ) +O(dt2). (SI-5a)
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Similarly, the chance ω(D → F)dt that a dysfunctional agent at time t is functional at time t + dt is the
chance 1× dt that this agent is chosen to produce once in the time interval (t, t+ dt), times the probability
P of successfully producing in that one attempt, times the chance 1− dt of not being hit by an exogenous
failure in time dt, plus higher-order terms O(dt2). Thus,
ω(D→ F)dt = dt× P +O(dt2). (SI-5b)
In the limit dt→ 0, the events involving multiple jumps in the time interval (t, t+ dt) occur with vanishing
probability, so we approximate the system using only the terms in equations (SI-5) that are linear in dt.
SI-1.2 Global rates
Now we consider a system of many agents. Again, let dt be a small, positive amount of time. Let Ω(n →
n+ 1)dt be the chance that a system with n functional agents at time t has n+ 1 functional agents at time
t+ dt. To first-order in dt, we have
Ω(n→ n+ 1)dt = (N − n)ω(D→ F)dt+O(dt2) (SI-6a)
because each of the N − n dysfunctional agents at time t becomes functional at time t+ dt with probability
ω(D → F)dt. Here we are neglecting the probabilities of events that are of order O(dt2), such as the event
in which two agents change from D → F and one changes from F → D during the time interval (t, t + dt).
Similarly, the chance that a system with n functional agents at time t has n − 1 functional agents at time
t+ dt is
Ω(n→ n− 1)dt = nω(F→ D)dt+O(dt2). (SI-6b)
SI-1.3 Mean-field approximation of the master equation
From [47, equation 8.95], the expected number En(t) of functional agents at time t changes over time
according to
dEn(t)
dt
= −
∑
`
`E[Ω(n(t)→ n(t)− `)] (SI-7)
where Ω[n(t)→ n(t)− `] is the instantaneous rate at which the system jumps from n(t) functional agents to
n(t) − ` functional agents. In our case, by combining (SI-5) and (SI-6) in (SI-7) and dividing both sides of
the equation by N , we have
dEF(t)
dt
= −E [F(t)(1− P + )] + E [(1−F(t))P ] +O(dt2).
The mean-field approximation [47, page 255] is that fluctuations of F(t) ≡ n(t)/N can be ignored because
the number of nodes N is large, so E
[F(t)k] ≈ [EF(t)]k ≡ [F (t)]k. Thus, because P is a polynomial in
F , we approximate EP ≈ P [Binomial(m,F (t)) ≥ τ ], which (for simplicity) is how we defined the chance of
success P in the paper. Neglecting higher-order terms O(dt2) gives equation (2) in the main text:
dF (t)
dt
= −F (1− P + ) + (1− F )P
= P − F (1 + ).
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SI-2 Deriving the production function and interpreting the pro-
duction process
This section has two goals. The first goal is to derive the production function used in equation (3) from a
standard production function capturing the benefits of specialization [2, 55, 54] and a modification of the
threshold rule in the O-Ring model [20]. The second goal is to interpret this production process in a few
ways.
To begin, we fix notation. Consider an agent who attempts to produce a good. Suppose that agent
attempts to procure m inputs from m suppliers. The agent demands quantities of those inputs that we
denote by u1, u2, . . . , um.
When arranging for these inputs, it is not clear whether they will be successfully delivered and arrive
functional, not broken, not spoiled, and so on. Denote by x1, x2, . . . , xm the quantities of inputs that were
successfully delivered in a functional state: assign xi a positive quantity if the ith input is delivered in
functional, working condition, and assign xi the value 0 if it is not delivered successfully or if the input is not
functional for some reason. The output of the agent is denoted by the production function f(x1, x2, ..., xm).
SI-2.1 O-Ring-like threshold rule
First, we assume that some of the inputs are essential for production to succeed, and without those critical
inputs production fails. For simplicity, we do not keep track of which inputs are essential but merely count
the number of them. Let
S :=
∑
i : xi>0
1 (SI-8)
denote the number of inputs that are successfully delivered.
Assumption 1 (O-Ring-like threshold rule) Production succeeds [i.e., output f(x1, x2, . . . , xm) is pos-
itive] if and only if the number of functional inputs S equals or exceeds a threshold number τ .
Assumption 1 is related to the production function used in the “O-Ring” model of economic development [20].
In the O-Ring model, a product is produced in a sequence of steps. Failure of any of these steps drastically
reduces the value of the product. Here, we generalize the O-Ring rule such that firms can continue to produce
as long as redundancy (m− τ) offsets the failures of inputs.
For simplicity, we assume that extra functional inputs are not used:
Assumption 2 (Number of inputs used) If more than τ functional inputs are available, then only τ
inputs are used in production.
Next we interpret this production process in a few ways.
SI-2.2 Four interpretations of the production process
In this subsection, we briefly reiterate the primary interpretation of the production process that we use in
the main text, and then we give three alternative interpretations.
Firms simultaneously procure inputs, and we abstract from which pairs are substitutable The
interpretation that we focus on in the manuscript is that a firm procures m inputs simultaneously from other
agents, and some of those m inputs are perfect substitutes for one another. In reality, pairs of inputs have
differing amounts of substitutability, and considering this complexity in input–output networks is an ongoing
challenge for theorists [32]. In this interpretation, we simplify by ignoring which specific pairs are substitutes.
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Firms sequentially procure inputs In this interpretation, we do track which inputs are substitutable.
Consider firms searching for inputs over a certain period of time. If the firm does not successfully produce
within that period of time, then the firm fails to produce anything and becomes dysfunctional, for example
because the inputs spoil, or because debts must be repaid, or because the growing season has passed.
Suppose that each of the τ different inputs needed (from Assumption 1) is produced by a large set of
identical firms. Each of these sets of firms (or “industries”) produces a distinct good. Other than that, these
industries are completely symmetric, so the (expected) fraction of functional firms in each industry is the
same value, F (t).
A firm commits in advance to a budget for how many times (m) it can attempt to procure a functional
input from one of these τ many industries. Each attempt to procure a functional input is an independent
Bernoulli trial with probability F (t). The firm procures inputs until either it gets τ or more functional inputs
(with one functional input from each of the τ industries) or until it has exhausted its m attempts.
Although the firm draws Bernoulli trials sequentially, suppose for theoretical purposes that we knew the
results of the next m Bernoulli trials. The firm will observe some or all of these trials, depending on their
outcomes. The chance that the firm succeeds in producing is the chance that these m trials contain at least
τ successes. In other words, the chance that the firm succeeds in producing is the chance that a binomial
random variable with parameters m and F (t) is greater than or equal to τ . Provided that the time period in
which the firm can attempt to procure m inputs is brief enough so that F (t) can be assumed to be constant,
this interpretation is consistent with the model studied in this paper.
Search intensity Another interpretation involves search intensity and research costs. We illustrate this
interpretation using the case study on drip irrigation [42] summarized in the manuscript.
Consider a farmer preparing for the upcoming growing season. The farmer decides to attempt to use
drip irrigation, which requires a large number (τ) of inputs in order to succeed, such as the 6-tuple
(seeds, labor, rubber tubes, pump, know how, municipal water).
The farmer has a limited amount of time to research which kinds of seeds, pump, and rubber tubes best
match the local conditions, including the acidity of the soil, the pressure of the water supply, which animals
might chew the tubes, and so on. The farmer attempts to procure each of the τ = 6 inputs and can reduce
the risk that the crop fails during the coming growing season by spending more time and effort researching
which inputs are most compatible with the local conditions.
The mean-field approximation studied here captures this scenario in a stylized way. We denote by x ∈
{0, 1, 2, . . . } a discrete measurement of the intensity with which the farmer searches for the best or most
compatible inputs. We assume that the probability that the farmer successfully produces is a function of
the complexity τ of the technology, the intensity x of her search, and the reliability F (t) of the economy.
Formally, in our model this probability is identified with the probability that a binomial random variable
with parameters τ + x and F (t) is at least τ . The “research costs” are α × (τ + x). A more natural model
might have the search intensity reduce the failure rate in a continuous way, but this formulation with a
binomial random variable has qualitatively similar behavior.
Production flexibility The fourth and final interpretation considers flexibility in what a firm can produce
from a certain collection of inputs. Assume that a firm tries to procurem distinct inputs that can be combined
to produce
(
m
τ
)
many distinct products that involve τ inputs each. All of these products are assumed to have
similar market potential. When the number of available functional inputs is τ or greater, a firm is indifferent
to which output to produce, so it randomizes among them.
The difference m − τ is a stylization of manufacturing flexibility studied in management literature [77],
in particular of “(product) range flexibility”, which is the number of products a firm can produce without
prohibitive switching costs [77, 78]. Greater flexibility enables the firm to continue producing even if some
inputs are not available in functional form.
This interpretation is also conceptually related to the microfoundation of a “global production function”
developed in [79]. In [79], the global production function computes the maximum amount of output per
worker that can be produced using an available set of “production techniques”, which are mappings from
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inputs (such as capital and labor) to output. To see the conceptual relationship with the “production
flexibility” interpretation of our model, note that we can interpret number
(
m
τ
)
as the number of production
techniques that a firm can use to produce output, in the spirit of [79]. Each production technique is a
mapping from τ many inputs, (x1, . . . , xτ ), to output. The output of a production technique is given by
equation (SI-9) (found below) provided that enough inputs are functional; otherwise, the output is 0. The
production techniques available to a firm are endogenously determined by the firm’s choice of (m, τ) (which
are chosen based on the state of the economy F (t)). A firm optimally chooses the production technique that
results in the highest output. Given the complexity of the problem, deriving the shape of a firm’s global
production function, as defined in [79], is outside the scope of this paper and is left for the future research.
SI-2.3 Positive returns due to specialization
Next we introduce a standard production function that has been widely used in the economic literature to
model the gains from specialization, interpreting such specialization as an increase in the number of distinct
inputs combined to carry out production.
Assumption 3 Suppose an agent has enough functional inputs (S ≥ τ). Rearrange the indices of the
inputs x1, x2, . . . , xm so that x1, x2, . . . , xτ are all positive. An agent’s output is given by the following CES
(constant elasticity of substitution) production function:
f(x1, x2, ..., xτ ) =
(
τ∑
i=1
(xi)
ρ
) 1
ρ
, (SI-9)
where ρ ∈ (1/2, 1).
To understand why (SI-9) indeed embodies gains from specialization, consider the following thought exper-
iment. Suppose input prices are fixed – for simplicity, let all of them be equal – and consider a firm that has
at least τ many functional inputs available (i.e., S ≥ τ). Rearrange the indices of the inputs x1, x2, . . . , xm
so that x1, x2, . . . , xτ are all positive. If the firm wants to maximize production and has a certain amount
of funds E available to buy inputs, then it must demand the same amount of each of the intermediate
inputs used. Thus, by Assumption 2, it can use for example the first τ and demand ui = xi = E/τ for
i = 1, 2, . . . , τ , so the output is
f(x1, x2, ..., xτ ) = E × τ (1/ρ)−1 = Eτβ (SI-10)
where β := (1/ρ) − 1. Then, if we further make the usual assumption that the elasticity of substitution
σ := 1/(1−ρ) is positive, we arrive at the conclusion that ρ ∈ (1/2, 1), so the elasticity of substitution 1/(1−ρ)
is positive and β ∈ (0, 1). In this case, we observe from equation (SI-10) that, as the number τ of intermediate
inputs purchased with the same funds E increases, so does the induced output. Hence, in an natural way,
we may describe the production technology as displaying positive returns due to specialization [2, 55, 54];
that is, efficiency grows as the production process is subdivided into a larger set of more “specialized tasks.”
Without any essential loss of generality, we may normalize the expenditure E to one. Then the production
function becomes
f(x1, x2, ..., xm) =
{
τβ if S ≡∑i : xi>0 1 ≥ τ
0 otherwise
. (SI-11)
Equation SI-11 is the production function that we use in equation (3) of the main text to determine the
utility attained at any level of specialization reflected by τ , given the prevailing fraction F of functional
agents and the cost induced by the number m of inputs they attempt to procure.
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SI-3 Interpretations of the marginal cost α of finding and procur-
ing inputs
We assume that attempting to get an input from another agent costs α > 0. This parameter can have one
of several interpretations:
Search costs The parameter α may capture the time and energy required to find each new supplier.
Maintaining multiple suppliers for an input Maintaining multiple suppliers for the same input can
be costly when that requires changing the product, working with suppliers to develop alternatives, or
overcoming quality issues with alternative inputs [56].
Incentivising suppliers to have multiple manufacturing sites If a firm has a certain crucial input
with just one supplier (a “strategic component”), it may “provid[e] incentives to [those] suppliers to
have multiple manufacturing sites in different regions” [57].
Maintaining inventory of inputs Inventory costs can be high: “as product life cycle shortens and as
product variety increases, the inventory holding and obsolescence costs of these additional safety stock
inventories could be exorbitant” [58].
SI-4 Strategies that could be a best response
Recall that the agents’ decision problem is to maximise the utility (3)
U [m, τ, F (t);α, β] = P [Binomial(m,F ) ≥ τ ] τβ − αm
over all pairs of non-negative integers (m, τ) ∈ N2, where N ≡ {0, 1, 2, 3, . . . }. The set of strategies (m, τ)
that could be a best response turns out to be a finite set, which enables numerical simulations.
Lemma 1 A best response (m∗, τ∗) must belong to the set
{(m, τ) ∈ N2 : m = 0 or 0 < τ ≤ m < τβ/α}. (SI-12)
Proof 1 First observe that if m = 0 then the utility is zero. If 0 < m < τ , then the utility is negative, so a
best response cannot have 0 < m < τ . Hence a best response must have m = 0 or m ≥ τ > 0.
In the latter case (with m ≥ τ > 0), the utility must exceed zero (the utility obtained with m = 0), so
P [Binomial(m,F ) ≥ τ ] τβ − αm > 0,
or, after rearranging and dividing by α > 0,
m < P [Binomial(m,F ) ≥ τ ] τ
β
α
≤ τ
β
α
. (SI-13)

Corollary 1 A best response (m∗, τ∗) with m∗ > 0 must satisfy τ∗ ≤ α−1/(1−β) and m∗ < α−1/(1−β).
Proof 2 From Lemma 1, we know that if (m, τ) is a best response with m > 0 then τ ≤ m < τβ/α. Now
we equate these lower and upper bounds on m. The equation τ = τβ/α has a two solutions: τ = 0 and
τ = α−1/(1−β). The latter provides provides an upper bound on τ in the best response. From Lemma 1 we
know that a best response must have m < τβ/α, so m < τβ/α ≤ α−1/(1−β). 
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Numerical calculations of a best response can be sped up slightly using the following two observations:
1. If m = τ > 0 is a best response, then U [m,m,F (t);α, β] = F (t)mmβ − αm > U [0, 0, F (t);α, β] = 0,
which can be rewritten as
m <
(β − 1)
log [F (t)]
W
( 1α) 11−β log [F (t)]
β − 1
 , (SI-14)
where W is the product logarithm (i.e., the Lambert W function). This upper bound on the diagonal
m = τ can be tighter than the one in inequality (SI-13).
2. If F (t) = 1, then every strategy with m ≥ τ will certainly succeed [i.e., P [Binomial(m,F (t)) ≥ τ ] = 1],
so the best response must have m = τ , and the first-order condition for the utility mβ −αm shows that
the best-response m = τ is either the floor or the ceiling of (β/α)
1/1−β
(whichever one results in more
utility).
If practice, if the best response is (0, τ), where τ ∈ N, then we take the best response to be (0, 0) because
it is not economically meaningful to have τ > m = 0 (it would mean that an agent requires some inputs to
produce but does not attempt to acquire any inputs).
In simulations, we compute the set of strategies that could be best responses as follows:
{(0, 0)} if F = 0
{(bγc, bγc), (dγe, dγe)} if F = 1
{(m, τ) ∈ N2 : 0 ≤ m ≤ α−1/(1−β), and either
m = τ satisfies (SI-14) or 0 < τ < m < τβ/α} if 0 < F < 1
(SI-15)
where
γ ≡
(
β
α
) 1
1−β
.
Given (α, β, F (t)), we compute the finite set of strategies that could be a best response [given by expres-
sion (SI-15)] and among those strategies we select the strategy with the highest utility [given by equation
(3) in the main text].
SI-5 Downturns in rich, highly functional
economies
Here we show that rich, highly functional economies undergo occasional spikes in dysfunction, akin to
economic recessions. These spikes in disruption occur even if there are no exogenous failures (i.e.,  = 0):
because agents can economize too much on redundancy, failures can spread.
Lemma 2 (Without exogenous failures, a completely functional economy is in steady state)
For  = 0, there is a steady state at F (t) = 1, at which agents best respond by choosing m∗ = τ∗.
Furthermore, m∗ = τ∗ equals the floor or ceiling of (β/α)1/(1−β) (whichever yields more utility).
Proof 3 In a completely functional economy [with F (t) = 1] without exogenous failures ( = 0), the ODE
for F (t) [from equation (2) in the main text] is
dF/dt = P − 1 (SI-16)
for τ > 0 (and dF/dt := 0 for τ = 0). Because F = 1, agents certainly succeed in producing (i.e., P = 1)
as long as m ≥ τ > 0. If P = 1, then choosing m to be greater than τ presents only costs and no benefits,
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so agents choose m∗ = τ∗. By computing the value of τ that maximises the utility function τβ − ατ , we see
that the best response at F (t) = 1 has m∗ = τ∗ equal to either the floor or ceiling of (β/α)1/(1−β) (whichever
yields more utility).
In summary, if m∗ = τ∗ = 0 then dF/dt = 0 [by definition; see the text after equation (2) in the main
text], and if m∗ = τ∗ > 0 then P = 1 and therefore dF/dt = 0 from equation (SI-16). 
Next we show in Lemma 3 that the steady state at F (t) = 1 is not stable to perturbations in F (t) because
agents do not have any redundancy (i.e., m∗ − τ∗ = 0) for F just below 1.
Lemma 3 (The best response has no redundancy at and just below F (t) = 1) Assume that α >
0, β ∈ (0, 1), and  ≥ 0. There exists F¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that the best response (m∗, τ∗) satisfies m∗ = τ∗
for F (t) ∈ (F¯ , 1].
Proof 4 We will prove the claim using the continuity of the utility function U [m, τ, F (t);α, β] [defined in
equation (3) in the main text] as a function of F (t). U is continuous in F (t) because it is a polynomial in
F (t) of degree m.
From Lemma 2, we know that for F (t) = 1 the best response is m∗ = τ∗ and that τ∗ equals the floor or
the ceiling of (β/α)1/(1−β) (whichever yields more utility). We denote this value of τ∗ by φ.
From Lemma 1, we know that the set of strategies that could be a best response is finite and depends on α
and on β but not on F . Denote using Φ the set of strategies that could be a best response, which is given in
Lemma 1.
Let δk denote the difference between the first-best utility and kth-best utility, where the k-th best utility is
defined to be the kth-highest utility among the set of strategies Φ that could be best responses.
Let δ := 1/2 × min{δk : 2 ≤ k ≤ |Φ|}. We know that δ > 0 because it is a minimum of finitely many
positive numbers (because |Φ| < ∞). Because U is continuous in F (t), there exists θ ∈ (0, 1) such that if
F (t) > 1− θ then
|U [m, τ, F (t);α, β]− U [m, τ, 1;α, β] | < δ (SI-17)
for all (m, τ) ∈ Φ.
Now fix F0 ∈ (1 − θ, 1) and let (m0, τ0) ∈ Φ be one of the possible best responses different from (φ, φ)
[which is the best response at F (t) = 1]. Let k denote the utility-rank of this strategy (m0, τ0) at F (t) = 1,
meaning that the strategy (m0, τ0) has the k-th highest utility at F (t) = 1. Then
U [φ, φ, F0;α, β] > U [φ, φ, 1;α, β]− δ by continuity of U [. . . , F (t), . . . ] (SI-18a)
≥ U [φ, φ, 1;α, β]− δk/2 by definition of δ (SI-18b)
= U [m0, τ0, 1;α, β] + δk/2 by definition of δk (SI-18c)
≥ U [m0, τ0, 1;α, β] + δ by definition of δ (SI-18d)
> U [m0, τ0, F0;α, β] by continuity of U [. . . , F (t), . . . ], (SI-18e)
so (φ, φ) is the best response for all F ∈ (1−θ, 1]. This argument completes the proof with F¯ := 1−θ ∈ (0, 1).

Finally, we arrive at our main result of this appendix: if the marginal cost of each attempted input (α)
is small enough, then a sufficiently functional economy undergoes spikes in disruptions, akin to recessions.
These spikes in disruption occur even in the absence of exogenous failures ( = 0).
Theorem 1 (Highly functional economies undergo spikes in disruption) If α < 2β − 1, β ∈ (0, 1),
and  ≥ 0, then there exists F˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that dF/dt < 0 for F ∈ (F˜ , 1).
Proof 5 From Lemma 3 we know that there exists F¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that the best response (m∗, τ∗) satisfies
m∗ = τ∗ for F ∈ (F¯ , 1], and from Lemma 2 we know that this m∗ = τ∗ equals the floor or ceiling of
(β/α)1/(1−β) (whichever yields more utility), which we denote by φ. Note that φ is nonincreasing in α.
Now we determine how small α needs to be in order for the best response to satisfy m∗ = τ∗ ≥ 2. To do
so, we equate utilities from pairs of strategies:
18
• An agent is indifferent between the strategies (m, τ) = (1, 1) and (0, 0) when F (t) − α = 0. This
observation, together with the observation that φ is nonincreasing in α, implies that for F (t) = 1 and
α ≥ 1 the best response is (0, 0).
• An agent is indifferent between the strategies (m, τ) = (1, 1) and (2, 2) when F 22β − 2α = F (t) − α,
which is a quadratic polynomial in F (t). The positive root is F+ := 2
−(β+1)
(
1−√1− α2β+2
)
. This
positive root F+ is equal to 1 when α = 2
β − 1, which is smaller than 1 for any β ∈ (0, 1). Therefore,
for α ∈ (2β − 1, 1) and F (t) = 1 the best response is (m∗, τ∗) = (1, 1). Moreover, for α ∈ (0, 2β − 1) and
F (t) = 1 the best response (m∗, τ∗) satisfies m∗ = τ∗ ≥ 2.
Finally, note that if m = τ ≥ 2, then the chance of successfully producing is P [m, τ, F (t)] = F (t)τ , which
is less than F (t) for F (t) ∈ (0, 1) because τ ≥ 2. In this case, the master equation (2b)
dF/dt = F (t)τ − F (t)(1 + ) (SI-19)
is negative for all 0 < F (t) < 1 and any  ≥ 0. Thus, the claim holds for F˜ := F¯ . 
SI-6 Modified model in which agents tend to keep functional sup-
pliers and tend to choose popular suppliers
Here we modify the choice of suppliers in two ways. First, agents tend to keep their suppliers who were
functional. Second, they bias their search toward suppliers who already have many customers. (When i
requests an input from j, we consider i a customer of j until i tries to produce again.) Specifically, when
agent i tries to produce, it chooses m suppliers from the population with replacement according to the
following weights. Agent j with k customers has weight
wj = r
S(j,i)(1 + k)ξ, (SI-20)
where S(j, i) is 1 if j successfully delivered an input to i last time i tried to produce, and otherwise S(i, j) =
0. The parameter r captures how “sticky” customer–supplier relationships are, while the “preferential
attachment” parameter ξ determines how strongly agents tend to choose suppliers who have high out-degree
k.1 Our original model is recovered with (r, ξ) := (1, 0).
Assuming r > 1 or ξ > 0 generates the same qualitative results insights of the model (the poverty trap,
overshooting in complexity, and rise-and-fall of buffers). However, it does generate two interesting effects
that we illustrate using numerical simulations. First, with r > 1 and ξ = 1, the economy is less likely to fall
into the trap. Because the model is stochastic and the simulations have finitely many agents, the economy
can fall into the poverty trap (and remain there) even if the master equation (2) predicts growth (dF/dt > 0).
With r > 1, agents tend to keep their functional suppliers, so they are more likely to successfully produce.
Consequently, functional agents tend to accumulate customers. If we also have preferential attachment
(ξ > 0), then agents further bias their search for suppliers toward functional agents because having many
customers is correlated with being functional.
This biased search for for functional suppliers has a downside, however. Once the economy becomes
complex and highly functional, it can rely on a handful of agents who supply almost all others. These
“hubs” can become dysfunctional because they need inputs from dysfunctional suppliers or because they are
hit by one of the exogenous failures that occur at rate . When that happens, the economy is so brittle and
so dependent on those hubs that it suffers cascading disruptions and a drastic downturn, as illustrated by
the large drops in the time-series F (t) in Supplementary Figure SI-1(b).
1ξ is the parameter of nonlinear preferential attachment [80]; in that model, ξ = 1 generates a power-law out-degree
distribution. Reference [81] found a power law out-degree distribution in Japan’s national, firm-level input–output network.
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Figure SI-1: A tendency to keep functional suppliers (r > 1) and to choose popular suppliers (ξ = 1) makes
it (a) easier to escape poverty but (b) once complex and developed, the economy is more fragile. In both
panels, the green curve is the original model [(r, ξ) = (1, 0)]; the magenta curve is the “modified model”
with sticky links (r = 2000) and linear preferential attachment (ξ = 1); and (α, β, ) = (0.15, 0.4, 10−4).
The economy has N = 200 agents in (a) and 1000 in (b). Panel (a) shows the mean fraction of functional
agents in the long-run F (103) as a function of the initial condition F (0); error bars denote 2 × s.e.m. for
103 simulations; the mean F (103) is significantly larger in the modified model for all F (0) ∈ [0.155, 0.2]
(p-value < 10−5, two-sided Mann-Whitney U test). Panel (b) shows two representative time-series F (t) with
F (0) = 0.7. The standard deviation of F (t) is significantly larger in the modified model [on average, 8.6
times larger; p-value = 10−251 in a two-sided t-test with 200 replicas of the simulations in (b)].
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